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SALAZAR V. BUONO: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY
THE REASONABLE OBSERVER TEST
SUMAHN DAS*
In Salazar v. Buono,' the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether the government could cure an Establishment
Clause violation caused by the display of a Latin cross on federal
property by conveying the property to a private group. 2 The Court,
declining to issue a final determination, used the reasonable observer
test, and held that the lower court should consider all of the relevant
facts for the reasonable observer test analysis such as the background
and context for the placement of the cross.3 In so holding, the Court
missed an opportunity to clarify its definition of the reasonable
observer test in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence by failing to
adopt a display-focused analysis that accounts for information
displayed at a religious statute or monument.4 As a result, the Court
gave new life to a fiction that leads to inconsistent applications of the
reasonable observer test.5 Even if the Court's reasonable observer test
is appropriate, and this author asserts that it is not, the Court
misapplied the test and thus came to the wrong conclusion.6
1. THE CASE
Frank Buono brought suit to challenge the preservation of a
Latin cross on federal land within the Mojave National Preserve.' The
cross was located in an area known as Sunrise Rock.8 In 1934, the
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) erected the cross to serve as a
memorial to veterans who died in World War 1.9 Over the years, the
cross was maintained and replaced several times by private parties.10
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1. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
2. Id. at 1811.
3. Id. at 1819-20.
4. See infra Part W.A.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-05 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 371
F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1205.
10. Id.
126 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 11:1
No signs or plaques were present to indicate that the cross was
intended to function as a memorial for soldiers." The National Park
Service (NPS), which maintains the Mojave National Preserve, did not
allow other individuals or private groups to erect other displays in
Sunrise Rock.12
The controversy surrounding the cross began in 1999 when the
NPS received a letter requesting permission to build a Buddhist shrine
in an area located near the cross.13 The NPS responded that agency
regulations forbid the construction of religious symbols and that it
intended to remove the cross located at the site. 14 The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) sent the NPS a letter threatening legal action
if the cross was not removed.15 After evaluating the cross and its
historical significance, the NPS determined that it would remove the
cross. 16 Before doing so, however, the NPS consulted local citizens
who indicated that there would be considerable public opposition to
removal of the cross.17 The individuals who maintained the cross
refused to voluntarily remove the cross and stated their determination
to replace the cross if it were taken down.' 8 After considering the
public opposition, the NPS did not remove the cross.19 On December
15, 2000, Congress forbade the use of government funds to remove the
cross.20 Thereafter, the NPS could not remove the cross as a result of
the legislative spending ban.21
Buono and the ACLU filed suit alleging a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and seeking an
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1205-06.
14. Id. at 1206.
15. Id. The letter included a threat that the ACLU would pursue a private damage
claim against government officials, stating "If we do go forward with a lawsuit, a court not
only would order the government to remove the cross, but it also likely would assess damages
against those responsible government officials who knew about the cross and yet did nothing
about it [in] the face of the clear constitutional commands that make its presence on
government property illegal." Id.
16. Id The NPS decided that the "cross did not qualify for inclusion in the National
Register of Historic Places." Id. Moreover, the NPS cited the threatened private damage claim
in its decision to remove the cross. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Id
20. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A-230 (2000).
21. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
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injunction to remove the cross.22 The litigation proceeded in four
stages until it reached the Supreme Court of the United States. 23 In the
first stage, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California ruled in favor of Buono and ordered the removal of the
cross (Buono 1). 2 4 The court first found that Buono had standing to
challenge the placement of the cross. Then, the court applied the
Lemon test in determining that the cross was in violation of the First
Amendment: "A government religious practice or symbol will survive
an Establishment Clause challenge when it (1) has a secular purpose,
(2) has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
(3) does not foster excessive state entanglement with religion."25 First,
the court expressly declined to analyze the purpose prong because the
effect of the placement of the cross signaled governmental
endorsement of religion.26 Second, the court evaluated the primary
effect of the cross on the reasonable observer. 2 7 The court concluded
that the placement of a cross on federal land would convey an
impression of governmental endorsement of religion to the reasonable
observer.2 8
While Buono I was pending before the district court, Congress
designated the cross as a national memorial commemorating the
United States' participation in World War I and directed the Secretary
of the Interior to spend up to $10,000 to "acquire a replica of the
original memorial plaque and cross and to install the plaque in a
suitable location on the grounds of the memorial." 29 Three months
after Buono I was decided in favor of the Plaintiff, Congress again
prohibited the use of government funds to remove the cross.30 While
22. Id at 1207. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
23. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010).
24. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. The court found that Buono had standing to
challenge the preservation of the cross because he came into unwelcome contact with the cross
and was offended by its presence. Id at 12102-14. The court found that Buono showed an
actual, concrete and particularized injury. Id. at 1212.
25. Id. at 1215 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
26. Id. at 1215. The court noted that the Lemon test is a disjunctive test: "State
action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs." Id. (quoting
Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)).
27. Id. at 1216.
28. Id.
29. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. 107-117, § 8137, 115
Stat. 2278 (2002).
30. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. 107-248, § 8065(b),
116 Stat. 1551 (2002).
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the government's appeal was pending, Congress also passed a law
directing the Secretary of the Interior to transfer the land on which the
cross was located to the VFW. 3 1 The statute provided that the
Secretary of the Interior would continue to maintain the national
memorial and that the property would revert back to the government if
32it was no longer maintained as a war memorial.
On appeal (Buono II), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit stayed the district court's order to the extent that it
required the cross to be removed or dismantled but did not forbid
alternative methods of complying with the order. 33 Accordingly, the
government covered up the cross. 34 In Buono II, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment.35 Using the reasonable observer
test, the court found that a reasonable observer would know, or at least
suspect, that Sunrise Rock is federally-owned land and that the cross is
a Christian symbol.36 The reasonable observer would know that the
cross was erected by private individuals but that Congress has taken
various measures to preserve the cross. 37 Consequently, the court held
that the cross violated the effects portion of the Lemon test and
signified governmental endorsement of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 38 The court did not address whether the land
transfer statute was an independent violation of the Establishment
Clause.39 The government did not appeal the judgment in Buono II so
that judgment became final.40
After the court of appeals upheld the injunction ordering
removal of the cross in Buono II, Buono returned to the district court
to modify the original injunction to prevent the land transfer (Buono
Il).41 The district court declined to address whether the land transfer
was an independent violation of the Establishment Clause. 42 The court
did however conclude that the land transfer was an attempt to keep the
31. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-87, § 8121, 117
Stat. 1100 (2003).
32. Id.
33. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 546.
40. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010).
41. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd and reh'g
denied, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
42. Id. at 1182 n.8.
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cross atop Sunrise Rock and subvert the court's original injunction.43
The court reasoned that the government's reversionary interest and
continued involvement in maintaining the war memorial belied the
contention that the government has given up control over the
property. 44 Because the government engaged in "herculean efforts to
preserve the Latin Cross on federal land," the Buono II court
permanently enjoined the implementation of the land transfer statute. 4 5
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
enforcing its prior injunction (Buono IV). 46 The court in Buono IV
agreed that the land transfer was an attempt by the government to keep
the cross on display without actually curing the Establishment Clause
violation.47 The court reiterated its previous analysis of the reasonable
observer in Buono II. Because the reasonable observer would know
about the government's attempts to preserve the cross, that the
government rejected the placement of other religious symbols, and that
the area around the cross is public land, the presence of the cross
violated the Establishment Clause.4 8 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari to consider the validity of the injunction in
Buono III barring the implementation of the land transfer statute. 49
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
43. Id. at 1182.
44. Id. at 179.
45. Id. at 1182.
46. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007), affd and reh'g
denied, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
47. Id at 1085.
48. Id. at 1086 ("Under the statutory dictates and terms that presently stand, carving
out a tiny parcel of property in the midst of this vast Preserve-like a donut hole with the cross
atop it-will do nothing to minimize the impermissible governmental endorsement.").
49. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010). After the Supreme Court issued
its opinion, the cross was stolen. Caroline Black, Mojave Cross Honoring U.S. War Dead
Stolen in Middle of the Night, CBSNEWS.COM (May 12, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20004719-504083.html. Outraged veterans
groups offered a $25,000 reward for information leading to the capture of the individuals
responsible for the theft. Id. One week later, a replacement cross was erected anonymously,
but the National Park Service removed the cross from Sunrise Rock. Offer of New Home for
Mojave Cross Goes Unanswered, DESERTDISPATCH.COM (June 15, 2010),
http://www.desertdispatch.com/news/cross-8679-mojave-home.html.
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religion.. . ."o In Lemon v. Kurtzman,si the Supreme Court
articulated a three-pronged test to determine if a government action
violates the Establishment Clause.52 According to the test, the activity
must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not involve
excessive government entanglement with religion.53
Since 1983, however, the Court has failed to uniformly apply
the Lemon test, and signaled that it might apply other tests to decide
Establishment Clause violations.54 A year after establishing the Lemon
test, the Court dismissed it just as easily in Lynch v. Donnelly, in
which the Court stated "no fixed, per se rule can be framed. The
Establishment Clause .. . is not a precise, detailed provision in a legal
code capable of ready application." 56 The Court explained that the
Constitution does not require the complete separation between religion
and the state. 57 Rather, what the Constitution reuires is that the state
not advance or endorse a particular religion. Justice O'Connor
concurred in the opinion and modified the purpose and effect prongs,
creating the endorsement test.59 The endorsement test essentially asks
what message the government intended to convey and what message
was actually conveyed to the reasonable observer. However, there
are competing definitions of the reasonable observer and
disagreements over the amounts of information to impute to the
reasonable observer.61
50. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
52. Id. at 612-13.
53. Id.
54. Lisa Langendorfer, Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 709 (1999). For instance, in
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983), the Court upheld prayer in the Nebraska State
Legislature without even applying the Lemon test. Id.
55. 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984).
56. Id. at 678.
57. Id. 673.
58. Id at 682.
59. Id. at 687-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable
Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Ordern
v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L.R. 139, 144 (2006).
6 1. Id.
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B. Justice O'Connor's Reasonable Observer
According to Justice O'Connor, the purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to prevent the government "from appearing to
take a position on religion or from making adherence to religion
relevant to a person's standing in the political community." Justice
O'Connor argued that a government action violates the Establishment
Clause when the action has the effect of "communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion." 63 Therefore, her
endorsement test shifted the focus from the government act itself to
perceptions of the act in the community.64 Justice O'Connor expected
the reasonable observer to be familiar with the "history and ubiquity"
of the government's action.65
Justice O'Connor more clearly stated the concept of the
reasonable observer in her concurring opinion in Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette.66 In Pinette, she argued that the
reasonable observer must possess more information than the casual
67
passerby or the actual perception of individual observers. Rather,
Justice O'Connor favored a definition similar to the reasonable person
in tort law, who "is 'rather a personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social
judgment."' 68 The reasonable observer must be deemed to have
knowledge of the history and context of the forum in which a religious
symbol is displayed, and the knowledge must not be limited to the
information available at the symbol.69 Instead, the reasonable observer
would be "acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute" concerning the display.70
Justice O'Connor applied this definition to a cross that the Ku
Klux Klan displayed on the lawn in front of the Ohio State Capitol. 7 1
She found that the reasonable observer would be aware that the
displayed cross is a religious symbol, that the property is owned by the
state, that the adjacent building was the state capitol, the general
62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
63. Id. at 692.
64. Kosse, supra note 60, at 144.
65. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
66. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
67. Id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. at 780.
69. Id.
70. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780-81.
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history of the place in which the cross is displayed, and that the square
is a public place where secular and religious groups engage in
expressive conduct. 72 On these facts, Justice O'Connor concluded that
this knowledge would lead the reasonable observer to believe that the
state was not endorsing religion.73
C. Justice Stevens' Reasonable Observer
In his dissenting opinion in Capitol Square, Justice Stevens
sharply criticized Justice O'Connor's formulation of the reasonable
observer.74 He asserted that O'Connor's definition is a legal fiction
because the reasonable observer "comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a
being finer than the tort-law model." 75 To Justice Stevens, the tort law
model would deprive constitutional protection to every reasonable
person who falls below Justice O'Connor's ideal standard.76 He would
extend Establishment Clause protection "to the universe of reasonable
persons and ask whether some viewers of the religious display would
be likely to perceive a government endorsement."77 Justice Stevens
agreed that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect an
individual "from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of
faith" and outside the political community. 78
In applying the reasonable observer test, Justice Stevens
stressed the fact that the religious symbol was placed on government
land, which implies official recognition and reinforcement of its
message. 79 The reasonable observer of any unadorned symbol on
public property would naturally assume that the government has
sponsored and facilitated its message.80 Because he would not impute
any additional knowledge to the reasonable observer, Justice Stevens
would hold that some reasonable person would perceive governmental
- - 81
endorsement of religion.
72. Id. at 780-82.
73. Id. at 782.
74. Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis supplied).
78. Id. at 799.
79. Id. at 801.
80. Id. at 801-02.
8 1. Id.
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D. The Ten Commandments Confusion
As a result of the disparities and disagreements on the Supreme
Court in applying the reasonable observer framework, the lower courts
have struggled in their analyses and applications of the rule.8 2 The
Supreme Court failed to clear up the confusion in the spring of 2005
when it decided two similar cases applying the reasonable observer
test in the Ten Commandments context. These two cases demonstrate
the Court's inconsistent application of the reasonable observer test.
1. Van Orden v. Perry
In Van Orden v. Perry,83 the Supreme Court decided whether
or not the display of the Ten Commandments on the frounds of the
Texas State Capitol violated the Establishment Clause.8 The Fraternal
Order of Eagles erected the monument in 1961. It stood about six feet
high and three and one-half feet wide and was located in between the
Capitol and Supreme Court building.85  The text of the Ten
Commandments was the largest inscription on the monument.86 The
monument was one of seventeen other statues, monuments, and items
on the Texas State Capitol grounds that commemorate Texas' history
but is the only monument with religious text.87 While there was no
clear purpose for the religious text, the government asserted that its
purpose was to honor the Fraternal Order of Eagles' efforts, promote
morality and prevent juvenile delinquency, and acknowledge the role
of the Ten Commandments in American law.88
In Van Orden, the Court declined to apply the Lemon test and
held that displaying the monument on government property was
constitutional. Writing for a plurality, Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the Ten Commandments monument had religious
significance but argued that it was within the realm of acceptable
acknowledgements of religion in the American heritage.90 Justice
Rehnquist cited instances where the Court acknowledged the role of
82. See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique
of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 527-29 (2005) (discussing cases where the
lower courts struggled with the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
83. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
84. Id. at 681.
85. Id. at 681-82.
86. Id. at 681.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 690.
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religion by permitting prayer before a state legislature's daily sessions
and upholding laws "that prohibited the sale of merchandise on
Sunday."91 Because the placement of the Ten Commandments
monument was a "passive use" of the religious text, the Court upheld
its placement on the Texas State Capitol grounds.92
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. 93 Justice Thomas
asserted that the Court's precedent commanded a judgment that the
monument did not violate the Establishment Clause.94 In so doing, he
delivered a critique of the Court's precedent that requires the use of the
reasonable observer test.95 He reasoned that the test looks to the view
of the "unusually informed observer," which does not serve religious
adherents or nonadherents. 96 The nonadherent is likely more sensitive
than the reasonable observer, and the adherent might take offense at
the removal of the religious display.97 Noting that the Court has
inconsistently applied the reasonable observer test, Justice Thomas
maintained that Establishment Clause jurisprudence turns on judicial
predilections. 98
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.99 Acknowledging
that it was a borderline case, he determined that the context in which
the religious symbol was displayed did not lend itself to government
endorsement of religion.' 0  Because the Ten Commandments
monument communicated a secular message as well as a religious
message and because the monument has been displayed for over forty
years without challenge, Justice Breyer concluded that a reasonable
observer would not perceive governmental endorsement of religion.101
Justice Stevens dissented because, using the reasonable
observer test, he found the Ten Commandments monument only
91. Id. at 687-88.
92. Id. at 691.
93. Id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 694.
95. Id. at 696.
96. Id. The Court came close to adopting Justice O'Connor's definition of a
reasonable observer in Good News Club v. Mildred Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 127-28
(2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
97. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697.
98. Id. Although he criticized the reasonable observer test for its inconsistency,
Justice Thomas suggested a reworking of Establishment Clause jurisprudence to establish a
presumption of constitutionality for religious symbols unless the symbol had the effect of
coercing individuals to support or participate in a religious exercise. Id. at 697-98.
99. Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 700-01.
I01. Id. at 701-03.
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exhibited a religious message.102 He cast doubt on the secular purposes
for erecting the monument, including the idea that the government
should combat juvenile delinquency through biblical teachings.1 03 The
Ten Commandments unquestionably endorsed Christianity and
commanded a preference for religion over irreligion, and, therefore,
allowing the monument to display on public property would propagate
a religious message.' 04 He suggested that any religious display on
public property should invoke a presumption of unconstitutionality.' 0 5
Justice Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which
Justice Stevens joined.106 Justice Souter used the reasonable observer
test and concluded that a viewer of the Ten Commandments
monument would unmistakably conclude that the Ten Commandments
constitute a religious statement and that the purpose of selecting the
Ten Commandments for a display is religious. 107 Justice Souter
disagreed with the assertion that the Ten Commandments display
when viewed with the other secular monuments denotes a secular
message. os However, a viewer strolling through the state capitol
grounds "would surely take each memorial on its own terms without
any dawning sense that some purpose held the miscellany together
more coherently than fortuity and the edge of the grass." 09
Accordingly, the reasonable observer would have no difficulty
discerning a religious message from the Ten Commandments
monument.1 0 Justice O'Connor dissented for the reasons given by
Justice Souter in the instant case and her concurrence in the
companion Ten Commandments case, McCreary v. ACLU.
2. McCreary v. ACLU
In McCreary v. ACLU,' 1 2 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a display of the Ten Commandments and eight
other documents purported to be foundational to American
government on the walls of two county courthouses.113 Justice Souter,
102. Id. at 707-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 715.
104. Id. at 720-21.
105. Id. at 721.
106. Id. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 738.
108. Id at 743.
109. Id. at 742-43.
110. Id. at 738.
111. Id at 737 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
113. Id. at 855.
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writing for the majority, held that the government had an
impermissible sectarian purpose in displaying the Ten
Commandments. 114
Justice Souter rejected the government's assertion that the
Court need not consider the purpose of displaying the Ten
Commandments in the courthouse because examination of legislative
purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation. 11 He asserted that the
test to be used is the purpose belonging to an 'objective observer,' one
who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the
'text, legislative, histor ', and implementation of the statute,' or
comparable official act." 1 Justice Souter considered the statute's text
and that a pastor accompanied the county executive when he posted
the Ten Commandments, and concluded that the "reasonable observer
could only think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate
the Commandments' religious message."' 17 In addition, the reasonable
observer would find that the additional items displayed would not
dilute the religious meaning of the Ten Commandments.118
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she
agreed that the government's purpose in the display of the Ten
Commandments in the courthouse bespoke an endorsement of
religion.1 9 She concluded "[t]he purpose behind the counties' display
is relevant because it conveys an unmistakable message of
endorsement to the reasonable observer."l 20
3. Van Orden and McCreary, thus, demonstrate the difficulty of
consistently applying the reasonable observer test.
The Supreme Court decided these two similar cases on the
same day and came to different conclusions in each case. Such is the
result of imputing different facts to the reasonable observer. In Van
Orden, the Court upheld the display of the Ten Commandments on
government property, stressing the historical significance of the Ten
Commandments and that a private group displayed them for its own
114. Id. at 864.
115. Id. at 861.
116. Id at 862 (quoting Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
308 (2000)).
117.Id at 868-69.
118. Id. at 872-73. "If the observer had not thrown up his hands, he would probably
suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a religious document on
the walls of the courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality." Id. at
873.
119. Id. at 883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Id at 883-84.
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purposes. However, in McCreary, the Court rejected the historical
significance of the Ten Commandments, focusing only on the religious
meaning of the Ten Commandments and the government's role in
displaying the religious document. These cases highlight the
inconsistent application of the reasonable observer test in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Salazar v. Buono,121 the Supreme Court of the United States
used the reasonable observer test to conclude that the cross and the
land transfer statute was not necessarily a governmental endorsement
of religion but nonetheless remanded to the district court for further
review.122 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy concluded that
Buono had standing to maintain the action because he obtained a final
judgment and thus had a "judicially cognizable interest in ensuring
compliance with that judgment."1 23 The Court also took special note of
the procedural disposition of the litigation, which narrowed the Court's
scope to only determining the validity of the 2005 injunction barring
the implementation of the land transfer statute. 124 The case turned on
whether the land transfer could cure the Establishment Clause
violation previously adjudicated in 2002. 125 The Court concluded that
the district court did not properly assess the land transfer statute's
significance.126
The Court explained that injunctive relief is granted in light of
what a court believes will be the best course of action, but a court must
not ignore significant changes in the law or circumstances underlying
an injunction. 127 The land transfer statute was a substantial change in
the circumstances and should have bore on the propriety of the
requested relief.128 Even if the purpose of the land transfer was to
prevent the removal of the cross and thus subvert the district court's
injunction, the statute nonetheless might have been appropriate. 129
121. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
122. Id. at 1820.
123. Id. at 1814-15.
124. Id. at 1815.
125. Id. at 1815-16.
126. Id. at 1816.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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The Court took into account the government's efforts to avoid
removing a symbolic historical monument while also addressing the
endorsement problem. 130 The Court explained that the cross was not
erected to promote a Christian message, but rather to honor the
nation's fallen soldiers.' 3 1 The land transfer was Congress' attempt to
honor World War I soldiers while complying with the district court's
order.132 The First Amendment does not force the government to avoid
any public acknowledgement of religion's role in society. 133 Instead, it
leaves room to accommodate religion within a constitutionally
permissible framework.134
Without deciding if it was appropriate, the Court used the
reasonable observer test to conclude that the district court's analysis
was not complete in light of the changed law and circumstances after
the land transfer statute.135 Using Justice O'Connor's definition of the
reasonable observer, the Court stated that the "test requires the
hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all the
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding symbol and its
placement." 36 Applying the test requires a fact intensive inquiry.137
The Court explained that the district court did not consider the
background and context for the placement of the cross. 3 The
background and context of the cross reveal that it is a symbol of honor
for the nation's soldiers rather than a simple religious symbol.139
Noting that other specific remedies might be appropriate, the Court
remanded to the district court to reconsider its 2005 injunction and
conduct the fact-specific inquiry of whether alternative legal remedies
exist. 140
Justice Alito concurred with Justice Kennedy's opinion but
would not remand to the district court for reconsideration.14' He
explained that the factual record had been sufficiently developed to
130. Id. at 1816-17.
13 1. Id.
132. Id. at 1817.
133. Id at 1818.
134. Id. at 1819.
135. Id. at 1819-20. The Court did not decide the appropriateness of the reasonable
observer test because the land transfer would place the cross on private property, and as a
general matter, courts do not consider Establishment Clause challenges to objects on private
land. Id. at 1819.
136. Id at 1819-20. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 1820.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id
141. Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring).
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
implement the land transfer statute.142 Justice Alito outlined the history
of the placement of the cross and stressed that the cross was erected to
commemorate the American war dead in World War I.143 He
contended that removing the cross would not signify governmental
neutrality to religion but hostility to religious matters. 144 Thus, he
would respect the alternative approach Congress has chosen to remedy
the apparent Establish Clause violation.145
Justice Alito also applied the reasonable observer test to decide
whether the implementation of the land transfer statute would
constitute endorsement of religion.1 46 He used the same test Justice
Kennedy articulated;' 4 7 the reasonable observer would know the origin
and history of the monument, that the monument is located on
privately owned land, that the monument's owner is under no
obligation to maintain the present design, and that the transfer reflects
the government's best ability to deal with a unique situation and
accommodate conflicting concerns.148 He concluded that congressional
intention was not to embrace the religious message of the cross, but
rather to commemorate the nation's war dead.149
Justices Roberts and Scalia separately wrote concurrences that
did not implicate the reasonable observer test.15 0 Justice Roberts
reasoned that the government should implement the land-transfer
statute because it would have been consistent with the injunction if the
government removed the cross, transferred the land, and the VFW
raised the cross again.' 5 ' The land transfer statute would merely
dispense with the empty ritual.152 Justice Scalia agreed with the
plurality but determined that Buono did not have standing to enforce
the injunction.153
Justice Stevens dissented because Congress' decision to
transfer ownership of the property did not cure the Establishment
Clause violation. 4 Like the plurality, Justice Stevens noted the
142. Id
143. Id. at 1821-22.
144. Id. at 1823.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1824.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Id at 1821 (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1821.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1824-25.
154. Id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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procedural straightjacket that constrained the Court.15 5 Since the
government did not seek review of the Buono II ruling, it was settled
that the cross constituted a government endorsement of religion to a
reasonable observer.156 Justice Stevens reasoned that the narrow issue
before the court was whether the district court properly enforced its
2002 injunction by enjoining the land transfer.15' He agreed with the
plurality that the Court must consider whether changed circumstances
rendered enforcement of the original injunction inappropriate in order
to achieve the intended objective of the injunction.' However, Justice
Stevens contended that the district court was within its rights to find
that the land transfer would violate its original injunction and that it
would not cure governmental endorsement of religion.159 The land
transfer would require an affirmative act government act and would
permit the display of the cross at Sunrise Rock, violating the express
words of the injunction.' 60
Justice Stevens used the reasonable observer test to determine
that the government has endorsed religion notwithstanding the land
transfer because its effect will continue government endorsement of
religion and its purpose was to preserve the cross.'61 The reasonable
observer would consider "the nature of th[e] symbol, the timing and
the substance of Congress' efforts, and the history of the Sunrise Rock
site" and could conclude that the government chose to preserve the
cross because of the religious meaning of the cross.162 Justice Stevens
found that because the government has taken actions that explicitly
endorse the cross, the government's relationship to the cross does not
depend on the ownership of the land.163 The government acted several
times to prohibit the use of federal funds to remove the cross and
designated the cross a national monument.1 64 Far from simply
accepting the cross on its property, the government actively mandated
that the cross remain and will continue to maintain the site as a
national memorial. 165 Such actions demonstrate that the cross enjoys
155. Id.
156. Id. 1829.
157. Id. Justice Stevens specifically stated that the constitutionality of the land
transfer statute was not an issue before the Court. Id.
158. Id.
159.Id. at 1830-31.
160. Id. at 1831.
161. Id. at 1832-33.
162. Id. at 1841.
163. Id. at 1834.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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the government's imprimatur regardless of the owner of the underlying
land. 166
Even though Congress supported the placement of the cross
because of its significance as a war memorial, Justice Stevens
responded, "Making a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial
does not make the cross secular. It makes the war memorial
sectarian."l67 Furthermore, the reasonable observer would understand
that the purpose of the land transfer was to preserve the display of the
cross.168 This purpose would convey a message of government
endorsement of religion.169 Justice Stevens concluded by noting that
the government should honor its service members but the
government's decision to commemorate the nation's fallen soldiers
with a solitary sectarian symbol was an inadequate and inappropriate
tribute. 170
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of the United States missed an opportunity
to clarify the reasonable observer test in Salazar v. Buono. The
reasonable observer test, as applied by the Court, credits individuals
with more knowledge than that of an actual observer.17 1 The Court's
actor-focused analysis produces error.172 Rather, the Court should
adopt a display-focused analysis that accounts for information
displayed at a religious symbol.173 Using a display-focused analysis
would impute the proper amount of knowledge to the observer because
the information available to the observer would be gleaned from the
symbol itself rather than some other historical knowledge.174
Even if the Court's reasonable observer test was appropriate,
the Court misapplied the test because it did not consider all of the
relevant facts that a reasonable observer would know.17 5 The
reasonable observer would know that Congress intervened
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1835.
168. Id. at 1837.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1842.
171. See infra Part W.A.1.
172. Id.
173. See infra Part IV.A.3.
174. Id.
175. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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extraordinarily to preserve the cross, and that fact alone signifies
government endorsement of a religious message.176
A. The Court's Reasonable Observer Test is an Inappropriate
Mechanism to Decide Establishment Clause Cases.
When the government's purpose in the placement of a symbol
is unclear or indefinite, the reasonable observer does not know the
purpose of the government's action.177 The Court's definition of the
reasonable observer requires near omniscience, which is
implausible.178 Because symbols may have varying meanings, the
Court imputes knowledge to the reasonable observer based on the
meaning it finds in the symbol.179 Unless the Court clarifies the
reasonable observer test by using a display-focused analysis, the Court
should dispense with the reasonable observer test. 80
1. The Court's definition of the reasonable observer is a
fiction.
Under the Court's definition, a reasonable observer knows
more about the government's purpose than an actual observer of a
religious symbol.' 8' The fiction is the result of imputing knowledge
based on the context and history of the religious display rather than on
the information present at the display.' 82 While courts may plainly
divine a clear religious purpose in the display of a religious symbol,' 83
citizens normally will not be able to discern the legislative intent
behind government action.184 Justice Scalia stated as much in his
dissent in McCreary, where he reasoned that the majority of people
would be unfamiliar with the legislation mandating display of the Ten
Commandments in courthouses. Using the reasonable observer test
176. See infra Part IV.B.2.
177. See infra Part V.A.1.
178. Id.
179. See infra Part IV.A.2.
180. See infra Part IV.A.3.
181. Kosse, supra note 60, at 163.
182. Id.
183. See McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 871-72 (2005) (finding a clear religious
purpose in the display of the Ten Commandments in a Kentucky courthouse).
184. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 158 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] 'person of ordinary intelligence' is unlikely to 'perform[ ] the lawyer-like
task of statutory interpretation by reconciling the text of [ ] separate documents."') "Ordinary
people cannot be expected to undertake such an analysis [of legislative history]; rare is the
lawyer who could do it; and no two lawyers could be expected to agree. . . ." Id. at 160.
185. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 911 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to divine the government's purpose is also inapplicable when the
government has not declared its purpose or no legislative purpose
exists to discern the government's purpose.186
Buono demonstrates this problem because the government's
purpose was not clearly religious, but a person viewing the cross
would not know the overnment's secular purpose in maintaining a
cross on federal land.' An individual would know even less about the
government's purpose in enacting the land transfer statute. 188 The
Court suggests that the reasonable observer would know that
Congress, trying to balancing two competing objectives, balanced the
apparent Establishment Clause violation and interest in maintaining a
World War I memorial by transferring the land to a private group. 89
Imputing such knowledge to the average American is illogical.
Americans have a documented lack of knowledge regarding the
functions of our government and national history.190 AnIntercollegiate
Studies Institute study found that only twenty seven percent of
Americans know that the Bill of Rights prohibits the establishment of
an official religion, twenty five percent of Americans believe that
Congress shares authority over foreign policy with the United Nations,
and less than half of Americans can name all three branches of
191--government. Because most citizens are uninformed, an assumption
that the average American viewing a religious symbol will know the
legislative purpose behind displaying the symbol is unfounded.
The reasonable observer test is also inappropriate in light of the
significant gulf between the knowledge the plurality and the
knowledge the dissent would attribute to the reasonable observer. The
Court erred by expanding the reasonable observer test to require near
omniscience by indicating that the reasonable observer knows the
meaning of removing the cross. 192 The idea is that if the reasonable
observer knows that the purpose of the land transfer is to avoid
dismantling an historic war memorial, then the viewer will not
186. Kosse, supra note 60, at 165.
187. Stanley Fish, When Is a Cross a Cross?, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (May
3, 2010), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/.
188. See id The statute includes no legislative findings and the provision mandating
the land transfer is buried in a defense appropriations bill. See Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1100 (2003).
189. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010).
190. Civic Literacy Report - Major Findings, INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDIES INSTITUTE,
http://www.americancivicliteracy.org/2008/major-findingsfindingl.html (last visited April
14, 2011).
191. Id.
192. Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and
History, 105 Nw. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 47 (2010).
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perceive the transfer or the continued display of the symbol as a
governmental endorsement of religion. 19  The Court's approach
requires a judge to prognosticate as to the effect of the removal of a
religious symbol before it has occurred. The Court derived the idea
from Justice Breyer's opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, in which he
found that a monument's historical meaning was significant to the
endorsement test.194 The Court extended Justice Breyer's historical
preservation idea to suggest that a reasonable observer would know of
the value of preserving longstanding monuments and would adopt a
similar view. 95 The knowledge that the Court now imputes to the
reasonable observer "interconnects with observers' understandings of
government motives, [and] the level of contextual knowledge
attributed to observers .... "196 An expectation that the reasonable
observer would have such a deep understanding of the issues is
unrealistic.
2. Because symbols vary in meaning, the Court imputes
knowledge to the reasonable observer based on the
meaning it finds in a symbol.
Symbols can vary in historical meaning, thus requiring the
Court to choose among competing meanings. Justice Alito stated "a
monument may be 'interpreted by different observers, in a variety of
ways."' 1 97 He explained "[t]he 'message' conveyed by a monument
may change over time. A study of war memorials found that 'people
reinterpret' the meaning of these memorials as 'historical
interpretations' and 'the society around them changes."" 98 Justice
Alito stressed the historical aspect of the cross and argued that a
reasonable observer would be aware of the origin and history of the
cross. 199 Justice Alito's analysis reflects the idea that a court's function
is to decide the relative strengths and a "normative vision of whose
193. Id. at 49.
194. 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that the Ten
Commandments monument's 40-year unchallenged history suggests that "the public visiting
the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the tablets' message as part of what
is a broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage.")
195. Dolan, supra note 192, at 49.
196. Id.
197. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1822 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009)).
198. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009) (quoting
JAMES M. MAYO, WAR MEMORIALS AS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
AND BEYOND 8-9 (1988)).
199. Buono 130 S. Ct. at 1824.
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perceptions should govern in a particular cultural context." 200 Because
a symbol has potentially myriad valid reasonable meanings, the
reasonable observer will likely differ in the meanings they attach to
symbols. If the reasonable observer readily comes to varying
conclusions, a court's reasonable observer test is rendered
meaningless.
Discerning a symbol's meaning using context alone is
difficult. 20 1 It is usually impossible to delimit the outer bounds of
context, and accordingly, any attempt to establish a legal rule
dependent on context will lead to a subjective process of
adjudication.202 The diversity of views on the role of religion in society
is another factor that makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of a
religious symbol.203 Also, the imaginary construct of the reasonable
observer and the knowledge imputed to the reasonable observer is
manipulable depending on the context or social meaning, 204 the
outcome of a case turns on meaning that a reasonable observer
finds.205 Thus, the Court's definition of the reasonable observer turns
on its interpretation of a symbol.206
3. A display-focused analysis would credit the reasonable
observer with the correct amount of knowledge.
The reasonable observer test might be appropriate if it was
display focused, relying on information available while viewing a
religious symbol.207 Such a definition would cure the fiction that the
hypothetical observer would know the context and history surrounding
the placement of a religious symbol.208 Rather, a reasonable person
would most likely be able understand the purpose of a religious
209
symbol if information at the site explicitly stated the purpose.
The cross at Sunrise Rock did not have a plaque or any
information stating that it was a monument to those who died in World
200. Dolan, supra note 192, at 54.
201. Hill, supra note 82, at 515.
202. Id. at 515-16.
203. Id. at 518.
204. Id. at 506-07.
205. Id.
206. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. &
POL. 499, 519 (2002) ("It must be clear, however, that adoption of this definition would make
explicit what is now implicit: it effectively converts the reasonable observer into a majority of
the Supreme Court . . . .").
207. Julie Van Gronigen, Note, Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on its Context:
Analyzing Public Displays ofthe Ten Commandments, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 272-73(2004).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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War I. This fact alone makes it farcical to assume that someone
viewing the cross would know that Congress intended the cross to be a
war memorial. For the government to defend a constitutional claim
based on a religious symbol's historical meaning, it must disclose the
origin and purpose. 210 Without such disclosure, the broader reliance on
context and historical meaning turns into a reverence for tradition and
renders the Establishment Clause irrelevant. 2 11 The reasonable
observer test is inappropriate without a display-focused analysis
because the court credits a viewer of a religious symbol with more
knowledge than that person likely possesses.
B. The Court Misapplied the Reasonable Observer Test.
Even if the Court's reasonable observer test is appropriate, the
Court did not consider all the facts that a reasonable observer would
know when applying the test.212 Because of this error, the Court failed
to properly apply the reasonable observer test.213
1. The reasonable observer would know that Congress
specifically intended to support the placement of a religious
symbol.
Congress' actions indicate that the land transfer statute was
intended to preserve the placement of the cross at Sunrise Rock.2 14 The
Buono plurality argued that the hypothetical objective observer would
know not only that the cross was a depiction of religious message, but
that it was displayed by a private group to serve as a World War I
memorial.2 15 Moreover, the cross would be on private land, and
therefore, would not evoke the government's endorsement.216
However, the Court failed to consider the government's significant
involvement in the placement of the cross. Justice Stevens correctly
supplied more relevant facts that a well-informed, hypothetical
observer would know. 2 17
According to Justice Stevens, the reasonable observer would be
further informed that the government denied a private individual the
right to place a Buddhist monument near the cross, Congress
210. Dolan, supra note 192, at 53-54.
211. Id. at 54.
212. See infra Part IV.B.1.
213. Id.
214. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
215. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010).
216. Id. at 1819.
217. Id. at 1833-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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designated the cross a national memorial, Congress forbade the use of
federal funds to remove the cross after the district court's original
injunction, Congress enacted the land transfer statute specifically to
keep the cross in place, and the government maintained a reversionary
interest in the land if the cross is not displayed.218 Because of
Congress' actions, the district court concluded that the cross was a
religious symbol, that the government put its imprimatur on the
placement of the cross, and that the land transfer statute furthered a
violation of the Establishment Clause.2 19 The reasonable observer
would understand the procedural history leading to the continued
placement of the cross and that a federal district court decided that the
cross was a violation of the Establishment clause. These facts would
lead the reasonable observer to conclude that the Congress intended to
support the placement of a religious symbol.
2. In the eyes of a reasonable observer, the land transfer does
not cure the Establishment Clause violation.
Even after the land transfer, the reasonable observer would not
know that only the land under which the cross is displayed is private
property. The Ninth Circuit rightly observed that "carving out a tiny
parcel of property in the midst of this vast Preserve-like a donut hole
with the cross atop it-will do nothing to minimize the impermissible
governmental endorsement."220 The government retains a reversionary
interest in the land, and the government's ownership interest ripens if
the cross is not displayed. The well-informed, and according the Court,
reasonable observer, would be aware of the government's interest in
the land. Such facts would lead well-informed, reasonable observers to
conclude that the government has taken a position on the placement of
a religious symbol that the supposed secular purpose could not
overcome.
The reasonable observer would be aware of the government's
efforts to "de-religionize" the cross after the land transfer by claiming
that the cross has a secular meaning, suppressing the religious
meaning, and contending that the government disavows its support for
the placement of the cross by transferring the underlying land to a
private party.22 1 The argument is spurious because taking the religious
218. Id.
219. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd, 527 F.3d
758 (9th Cir. 2008).
220. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd and reh'g
denied, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
221. Fish, supra note 187.
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meaning out of the cross eliminates the significance that provoked the
desire to emplace the cross.222 Professor Stanley Fish laid out the
formula:
[I]f you want to secure a role for religious symbols in
the public sphere, you must de-religionize them, . . . by
claiming for them a non-religious meaning ... So you
save the symbols by leeching the life out of them. The
operation is successful, but the patient is dead.223
When the Court contended that the reasonable observer would
not perceive an Establishment Clause violation after the land transfer,
the Court pretended that the reasonable observer would not see the
government's hand in the placement of the cross despite accepting a
definition of the reasonable observer that imputes great knowledge to
him that far exceeds that of the actual observer. 224 The Court's
pretense, however, undermined its earlier statement that "[t]he
Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public
acknowledgment of religion's role in society." 225 The Court, then,
admitted that the cross retains its religious meaning even after
Congress acts. 226
V. CONCLUSION
In Salazar v. Buono, the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether a judge should have barred enforcement of a land
transfer statute that transferred property on which a Latin cross is
erected from the government to a private party.227 The Court used the
reasonable observer test to conclude that the district court did not
consider all of the relevant facts to apply the test.228 Because the Court
did not consider whether the reasonable observer test was appropriate,
it missed an opportunity to clarify the test in its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. The test creates a fiction because it assumes much
more knowledge than the average American possesses, and, therefore,
222. Id
223. Id.
224. Id
225. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).
226. Fish, supra note 187.
227. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811.
228. Id at 1819-20.
229. See supra Part W.A.
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should not be applied. 2 30 The Court should have adopted a display-
focused analysis when it applied the reasonable observer test.231 Even
if the reasonable observer test is appropriate, the Court erred in its
application because it did not consider all of the facts that a reasonable
observer of the Mojave cross would know.232
230. Id.
231. See supra Part IV.A.3.
232. See supra Part IV.B.
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